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I.  A BRIEF NOTE ON METHOD ........................................................3 
 
II.  THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ON TORT  
LAW ..................................................................................................3 
A.  IN PRACTICE, LIABILITY INSURANCE IS AN ELEMENT OF 
TORT LIABILITY .........................................................................4 
B.  LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS ARE DE FACTO 
CAPS ON TORT DAMAGES ..........................................................6 
C.  TORT CLAIMS ARE SHAPED TO MATCH THE AVAILABLE 
LIABILITY INSURANCE ...............................................................7 
D.  LIABILITY INSURERS ARE THE ULTIMATE “REPEAT 
PLAYERS” ..................................................................................9 
E.  LIABILITY INSURANCE TRANSFORMS TORT RULES INTO 
SIMPLE “RULES OF THUMB” ...................................................11 
F.  NEGOTIATIONS OVER INSURANCE BOUNDARIES DRIVE 







In June 2004 the European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law held a 
conference to consider the impact of liability insurance on the law of torts 
from a comparative perspective.  A highlight of that conference was the 
                                                                                                         ———— 
*  An earlier version of this essay was published in TORT LAW AND LIABILITY 
INSURANCE (Gerhard Wagner ed., 2005). 
**  Connecticut Mutual Professor and Director, Insurance Law Center, University of 
Connecticut School of Law. 
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opportunity to engage in extended conversation with Continental torts 
scholars.  In these conversations, I was struck by the depth of feeling that 
accompanied the insistence that liability insurance had not had an impact 
on tort law and, moreover, that it would be illegitimate for liability 
insurance to have such an impact.  I had arrived at the conference with a 
laundry list of what we knew and did not know about the impact of 
insurance on tort law, ready to discuss research agendas for extending that 
knowledge, and here I was confronted with a challenge to the basic 
premise. 
My answer was less immediately persuasive to the Continental 
challengers than I had expected.  They dismissed my explanation of the 
role of liability insurance in the narrowing of traditional tort immunities 
(e.g., intra-family, governmental, charitable) as a marginal development.  
Moreover, they could explain that development within their framework of 
law as an autonomous field.  In their view, the narrowing of traditional 
immunities simply reflected the successful expansion of tort law into the 
realms of the family, the state, and the church.  Insurance had little or 
nothing to do with it. 
In addition, they dismissed as irrelevant my description of the role that 
insurance plays in organizing the behavior of legal actors and therefore in 
shaping tort “law in action.”  That was sociology, not law. 
Crossing back over the Atlantic, I pondered my response.  The 
challengers’ point about the narrowing of tort immunities was a good one.  
Of course I was ready to explain how liability insurance allowed 
lawmakers to believe that inserting tort law into the domain of the family, 
the state and the church would be less disruptive than might otherwise be 
supposed (try telling that to the Catholic Church today) and, moreover, that 
liability insurance encouraged some defendants to attempt to abandon their 
immunity in order to force their liability insurers to compensate their 
victims.  But I recognized that the story of cause and effect here was not a 
clear one, and that even a carefully argued and documented story about 
immunities was unlikely to persuade my Continental colleagues. 
And so I resolved to rest my case on sociology, in the hope that I could 
persuade them to adopt a view of law that is encompassing enough to 
include the behavior of lawyers and litigants.  Adopting that view, they 










I.  A BRIEF NOTE ON METHOD 
 
Because I am describing the behavior of litigants and lawyers, 
traditional legal sources such as statutes, cases, and treatises are of little 
assistance.  Instead, drawing on a long tradition of sociological 
jurisprudence in the United States, I have gone into the field.  The sources 
for the quotations that I will use to illustrate my points are the Florida and 
Connecticut lawyers I interviewed for the studies reported in the Wisconsin 
Law Review and the Law and Society Review.1  I will also be drawing on 
my experience as a participant observer in a legal career that has kept me in 
near constant contact with lawyers, litigants, and a variety of insurance 
institutions. 
This approach can be dismissed as anecdotal,2 but it offers a view 
inside the workings of the legal system that no ordinary law book can 
provide.  While qualitative research of this sort does not provide conclusive 
evidence regarding the prevalence or extent of the practices observed, it 
can be used to frame more systematic quantitative analysis that may 
provide that evidence.  In the meantime, the persuasive power of qualitative 
research depends, like traditional doctrinal and policy argument, on the 
reader’s response to the coherence and plausibility of the analysis. 
 
II.  THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ON TORT LAW 
 
Leaving aside the difficulty in interpreting doctrinal developments, 
such as the abrogation of traditional immunities, liability insurance has at 
least the following six impacts on tort law in action.  First, for claims 
against all but the wealthiest individuals and organizations, liability 
insurance is a de facto element of tort liability.  Second, liability insurance 
limits are a de facto cap on tort damages.  Third, tort claims are shaped to 
match the available liability insurance, with the result that liability 
insurance policy exclusions become de facto limits on tort liability.  Fourth, 
liability insurance makes lawsuits against ordinary individuals and small 
organizations into “repeat player” lawsuits on the defense side, making tort 
law in action less focused on the fault of individual defendants and more 
                                                                                                         ———— 
1.  Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment Into Compensation: In the Shadow of 
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211 (1998); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, 
and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001).  As part 
of the research protocol, participants were promised confidentiality.  For quotations not 
previously published, I will identify the speaker simply as a plaintiffs’ or defense lawyer. 
2.  E.g., Daniel Kessler and Daniel Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice 
System (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.W10825, Oct. 2004). 
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focused on managing aggregate costs.  Fifth, liability insurance personnel 
transform complex tort rules into simple “rules of thumb,” also with the 
result that tort law in action is less concerned with the fault of individual 
defendants than tort law on the books.  Sixth, negotiations over the 
boundaries of liability insurance coverage (which appears nowhere in tort 
law on the books) drive tort law in action.  The sections that follow briefly 
describe each. 
 
A. IN PRACTICE, LIABILITY INSURANCE IS AN ELEMENT OF TORT 
LIABILITY 
 
The legal elements of tort liability are well known.  The defendant 
must have a legal duty to avoid harm to the plaintiff.  The defendant must 
have breached the standard of care that applies in the particular situation, 
and that breach must have caused damage to the plaintiff.  For a lawyer 
considering whether to take a particular case on a contingency basis, 
however, or for a litigant considering whether to finance a claim upon some 
other basis, these legal elements are only a starting point.  Liability by itself 
is not enough.  The defendant must have the ability to pay. 
In typically colorful language, the tort lawyers I interviewed 
emphasized this basic point: 
 
I was taught on my first day of practice there are three 
things: liability, damages, collectibility.  I need collectibility 
first.  I need damages second.  I'm a good lawyer, I'll prove 
liability.3 
 
Insurance has a fundamental effect on what this lawyer called 
collectibility—the defendant’s ability to pay and the facility with which the 
defendant can be made to pay. 
Given the extent of consumer debt, the availability of bankruptcy to 
discharge civil liabilities, and the existence of limited but important 
exceptions to the assets that must be liquidated in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
the practical reality of tort litigation in the United States is that liability 
insurance is the only asset that plaintiffs can count on collecting.4  As one 
lawyer put it: 
 
                                                                                                         ———— 
3.  Baker, Transforming, supra note 1, at 222. 
4.  See Steven G. Gilles, The Judgment Proof Society, WM. & MARY L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005). 




The ideal case, from a plaintiffs' perspective, would be a rear 
ender [auto accident], with terrible injuries, and a big 
insurance policy.  On the other hand, if you have a fall down 
on a private property with no homeowners [insurance], that 
sounds like the worst case.5 
 
My field research confirmed the obvious point that insurance is the asset 
that matters for all but the wealthiest of individual defendants and small 
organizations.6 
There is some evidence that this is also the case in many commercial 
disputes.  Professor Lynn Lopucki has advanced and defended the 
controversial but plausible thesis that corporate groups increasingly locate 
risk in entities with no assets and placing assets in entities with no risk,7 
with the result that the liability insurance of the risky entity is all that is 
available for victims if and when the risk matures into harm.  He may well 
have overstated the case for ordinary tort litigation, but for mass tort claims 
he is not far from the mark.  The increasing use of corporate bankruptcy as 
a mass tort litigation risk management tool makes liability insurance the 
asset that matters for mass tort victims as well.8 
If liability insurance is a de facto element of tort liability, then people 
without liability insurance will not be subject to tort liability.  In practice, 
people are required, either by law or contract in the U.S., to purchase 
liability insurance in a wide variety of settings (a fact that shows that 
lawmakers and strong contracting parties understand that liability insurance 
is a practical predicate for tort liability).9  But people are not required to 
purchase liability insurance in all settings.  For example, people who rent 
their home in the United States are rarely required to purchase liability 
insurance and rarely do so voluntarily.10  The only liability insurance most 
renters purchase is automobile liability insurance.11  As a result, most 
renters are, as a practical matter, immune from civil suit in the U.S., except 
in the case of an automobile accident. 
                                                                                                         ———— 
5.  Plaintiffs’ lawyer from Connecticut interviews.  See Baker, Blood Money, supra 
note 1. 
6.  Id.  See also Gilles, supra note 4. 
7.  See Lynn Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1 (1996). 
8.  See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening 
Mass Tort Liabilities, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000). 
9.  See Gilles, supra note 4. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
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This practical immunity does not show up in tort law on the books.  
But if broader renter’s insurance were required, and if the requirement were 
enforced, a new domain of opportunity would open for tort lawyers, and 
the resulting flow of cases would surely have some effect on the 
development of tort doctrine.  That effect might be as imperceptible on a 
day-to-day basis as the effect of lawyers’ feet walking up the steps to the 
courthouse.  But over time, pits and grooves will show.  Even if they do 
not, however, the shape of tort law as a field of action will have changed. 
 
B. LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS ARE DE FACTO CAPS ON 
TORT DAMAGES 
 
In contrast to what I understand to be the case for some insurance 
policies in some European jurisdictions, all liability insurance policies in 
the United States are sold with limits on the amount of money that the 
liability insurer is obligated to pay for a particular claim or event, even if 
the damages owed by the insured are much larger.  For example, as my 
European colleagues were shocked to learn, the limit on the mandatory 
automobile liability insurance policy in my state of Connecticut is $20,000 
per person, $40,000 per accident, meaning that the maximum amount that 
the liability insurer must pay any one person is $20,000 and the maximum 
amount that the insurer must pay all victims from any one accident is 
$40,000.  Of course, many people voluntarily purchase automobile liability 
insurance policies with limits that are much higher, but many people do 
not.  In addition to these per-claim or per-event limits, many liability 
insurance policies also contain a specified dollar limit on the total amount 
of money that the insurer is obligated to pay for all claims or events 
covered by the policy.  In my experience, such “aggregate” limits are 
nearly universal in commercial general liability policies in the U.S. (but not 
in automobile liability policies). 
For defendants who would not be sued in the absence of liability 
insurance, the fact that the insurance policy limit functions as a de facto 
“cap” on the defendants’ tort liability is obvious.  What may not be quite so 
obvious is that the policy limit more often than not functions as a cap even 
for defendants who have other assets.  There is good evidence that 
payments in excess of the policy limits are extraordinarily rare in cases 
involving individual defendants,12 and nearly as rare in cases involving 
                                                                                                         ———— 
12.  Baker, Blood Money, supra note 1.  See generally Bernard S. Black, Brian R. 
Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin, 
Working Paper No. 250) available at www.ssrn.com (reporting that directors and officers of 
corporations do not as a practical matter face any individual liability in securities fraud 




commercial defendants.13  I have concluded that this situation results from 
a combination of factors: the existence of a cause of action for breach of 
the insurer’s “duty to settle,” the anchoring effect of the policy limit during 
settlement negotiations, the liability insurer’s power to control settlements 
within the policy limits but not beyond the policy limits, and the related 
development of settlement norms within the tort litigation bar.14 
For present purposes, however, the reasons that liability insurance 
policy limits function as a cap on tort damages do not matter.  What matters 
is the consequence. Even tort litigation against wealthy individuals and 
large organizations has become, in all but the unusual case, an exercise in 
recovering money from liability insurance companies and only from 
insurance companies.15 
 
C. TORT CLAIMS ARE SHAPED TO MATCH THE AVAILABLE 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 
 
This next effect of liability insurance on tort law in action is a corollary 
to the first two.  If only people with insurance are sued, and if the suits are 
targeted at recovering insurance money, then claims that fit into one of the 
exclusions in the applicable liability insurance policy (and thus would not 
be covered by the policy) are not worth bringing.  Of course there are 
exceptions.  Some defendants have enough assets that insurance does not 
matter.  And some plaintiffs have the interest and the means to bring a 
lawsuit even when the defendant is not able to pay the damages.  But the 
existence of these exceptions does not change the effect that the general 
rule has on the shape of tort law in action. Exclusions in liability insurance 
policies create, in effect, remote islands of tort liability that lawyers and 
law professors know about, but almost no one goes to visit. 
                                                                                                                          
actions because claims are virtually always settled within the limits of their D&O insurance 
policies). 
13.  See TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 2002 TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE CLOSED 
CLAIM ANNUAL REPORT 2, available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/pdf/taccar2002.pdf 
(reporting that there was a payment in excess of policy limits in only 31 out of 9723 liability 
insurance paid claims in 2002 and that the total amount paid above the limits in those cases 
was $9 million, as compared to $1.8 billion in total liability payments in Texas in 2002; by 
comparison settlements by commercial insured within their deductible totaled $41 million in 
Texas in 2002). 
14.  See generally Baker, Blood Money, supra note 1. 
15.  The widespread recent publicity surrounding the fact that members of the 
WorldCom board of directors were paying some of their own money to settle the WorldCom 
securities fraud litigation provides some evidence in support of my claim. 
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One important example is the exclusion for intentional harm, which is 
nearly universal in liability insurance policies in the U.S. covering bodily 
injury.16  This exclusion explains the dearth of intentional bodily injury tort 
actions brought in the U.S.  The plaintiffs’ lawyers I interviewed explained 
this situation as follows: 
 
If you allege that he intentionally whacked her over the head, 
say with a baseball bat, okay, then the homeowner’s policy 
doesn’t come into effect.  If you say that he negligently and 
carelessly struck her or did something that he shouldn’t have 
done, then the homeowner’s policy comes into effect.  So, 
you’ve got to be very careful about what you allege—what 
your facts are. 
I'm not dealing with intentional torts and when I have what I 
think is an intentional tort, I couch my complaint in 
negligence and hopefully I'll get the same efforts from 
personal counsel for the defendant, the individual defendant 
or corporate defendant, to say we didn't mean it.17 
 
The defense lawyers corroborated this practice and explained that their 
duty to their clients means that they support the plaintiffs’ effort to shape 
the claim to meet the coverage: 
 
So what does the plaintiff’s lawyer do?  He doesn’t even 
bother to sue for assault and battery, if he has any sense.  He 
just proceeds on a negligence theory and does not bring the 
assault and battery theory, because there’s no coverage in 
assault and battery and he runs the risk of the jury filling in 
the assault and battery line instead of the negligence line, 
and how does he explain that to his client?  He got a hundred 
dollar judgment.  Try and collect it.  There’s no coverage. 
What about the scenario where the suit is just pled in 
negligence and it’s not pled as an intentional tort?  Now the 
insurance company hires you and you’re there defending the 
negligence action.  What are you going to do, say it wasn’t 
negligence but he did do it intentionally?18 
                                                                                                         ———— 
16.  See, e.g., The ISO Homeowners and Commercial General Liability Forms, 
reprinted in TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 338, 
411 (2003). 
17.  Baker, Transforming, supra note 1, at 223-24. 
18.  Id. at 225. 




Both legal rules and professional norms require defense lawyers to place 
the interests of the insured defendant ahead of the interests of the insurance 
company paying the defense costs.19  As a result, defense lawyers in the 
U.S. to some extent cooperate with the plaintiffs’ lawyer in shaping the 
claim to fit the available coverage. 
 
D. LIABILITY INSURERS ARE THE ULTIMATE “REPEAT PLAYERS” 
 
Tort doctrine treats tort liability as the responsibility of a particular 
defendant to a particular plaintiff for a particular wrong.  Liability 
insurance shifts the liability of the particular defendant to an entity for 
which that liability is simply one among an enormous portfolio of 
contingent financial obligations.  Legal norms obligate the insurance 
company, and to a greater extent the lawyer employed by the insurance 
company, to handle the liability claim so that the interests of the particular 
defendant are paramount,20 and in my experience insurance companies 
largely attempt to honor that norm. 
But insurance companies also recognize and act upon the fact that they 
hold a portfolio of claims.  This means that the results in one case can 
affect the results in another.  As a result, liability insurers have an interest 
in the development of tort law rules and settlement norms that goes far 
beyond the interests of any ordinary defendant.  In the terms of Mark 
Galanter’s classic study, liability insurers are the ultimate “repeat player.”21 
As reflected by the statement that follows, this portfolio approach to 
litigation management frustrates plaintiffs’ lawyers, but there is little that 
they can do about it: 
 
Unless your client’s a quadriplegic, they don't want to pay.  
And I think that's unethical, because I think what they do is 
they—they’re supposed to be dealing with each case 
separately under the canons and I think what they're doing is 
they say—they won't verbalize this exactly—“Yes, this case 
is worth the policy.  However, if we settle this case, then the 
next case will be brought, and we want to have a chilling 
effect on people suing our clients and reduce the overall 
amount we pay.  And the way to do that is by using this case 
                                                                                                         ———— 
19.  See generally, Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: 
From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1998). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Mark Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
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as an example.”  They definitely do that.  That's unethical.  
That's like me saying, “I know that Mary Jones, my plaintiff 
here, I know that her case is worth thirty-five thousand, but 
I'll settle for twenty because my other client's case for the 
same company, I think I can get an extra ten thousand for 
that, so it'll wash.  Plus they're a better client, because they 
have three cases.”  I don't see the difference.22 
 
The repeat player phenomenon makes tort law in action less focused on the 
fault of individual defendants and more focused on managing aggregate 
costs. 
Many liability insurance company executives would assert that their 
repeat player advantage is more than outweighed by the bias of judges and 
juries.  Judges and juries know that defendants have insurance, and as a 
result they are more likely to award the plaintiff damages, or so the 
argument goes.23  Interestingly, empirical research on jury behavior 
suggests that juries are at least as concerned with the health and other first 
party insurance held by the plaintiffs, and with making sure that the 
plaintiffs do not get a double recovery,24 but the direction of the bias is less 
important than the widespread belief that it exists.  Since cases are settled 
in the “shadow of the law” based on the parties’ predictions about what will 
happen in court,25 a widespread belief that juries act in certain ways has the 
same effect whether juries in fact act in that way or not. 
Liability insurance helps transform tort litigation into a multi-player 
iterative game that develops and transmits beliefs and norms that become 
part of the rules of that game.  In my view, those beliefs and norms 
constitute the real tort law for far more people than does the tort law on the 
books. 
 
                                                                                                         ———— 
22.  Plaintiffs’ lawyer from Connecticut interviews.  See Baker, Blood Money, supra 
note 1. 
23.  See, e.g., Kent Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1629 (1994). 
24.  See Shari S. Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden 
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001). 
25.  Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 




E. LIABILITY INSURANCE TRANSFORMS TORT RULES INTO 
SIMPLE “RULES OF THUMB” 
 
Ross’s classic study of automobile accident claims handling provides 
the most extended account of the way that insurance adjusters transform 
complex tort rules into simpler and more easily administered rules of 
thumb.26  In an important sense, this effect of liability insurance on tort law 
in action is simply an instance of the “repeat player” effect just described.  
But the practical implications of insurance adjustment are worth special 
mention.  Otherwise, one might be mislead into thinking that the repeat 
player status of the liability insurance company primarily affects only the 
development of tort law on the books. 
One of Ross’s best examples is the rear end collision—an automobile 
accident in which one car hits another car from behind.27  According to the 
formal tort law rule, liability depends on a careful and case-specific 
analysis of the accident and a consideration of whether the drivers 
exercised the degree of care that a reasonable person would ordinarily 
exercise in that situation.  Ross’s adjusters applied a simpler, easier to 
administer rule that probably had the same result as the formal rule in most 
situations.28  Their rule was that the driver of the car in back was liable in 
all cases.29 
Such rules are not universally applied.  The greater the stakes, the more 
likely that the rules of thumb will give way to the particularized 
assessments that formal tort doctrine requires.30  But, in the aggregate they 
combine to make tort law in action less focused on the individual fault of 
individual defendants than tort law on the books. 
Ross generalized from this example as follows: 
 
Adjustment of insurance claims compromises the legal 
mandate for individualized treatment with the need of a 
bureaucratic system for efficient processing of cases.  This 
compromise can be observed at many points in the processes 
of investigation and evaluation.  Investigation is vastly 
simplified, for instance, by presumptions as to liability based 
                                                                                                         ———— 
26.  H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE 
CLAIMS (1970). 
27.  Id. at 98-101. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. at 135 (“An injury situation that can qualify a claim as a ‘big case’ may receive 
something of the individualized treatment envisaged by the appellate courts.”). 
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on the physical facts of the accident.  Accidents are thus 
seldom individualized to an insurance adjuster or a claims 
attorney.  Rather, they are rear-enders, red-light cases, stop 
sign cases, and the like, and the placement of an accident 
into one of these categories ordinarily satisfies the 
requirements for investigation of liability. . . .  
These observations are not meant as criticism of the 
good faith of the insurance industry or other parties 
associated in the handling of claims.  Rather they are meant 
to put claims handling into proper context; to show that here 
as elsewhere—for example in handling pleas to criminal 
charges, or in making decisions as to whether a mental 
condition merits institutional commitment—a large scale 
society proceeds by routinizing and simplifying inherently 
complex and difficult procedures.  This is how the work of 
the world is done.  This is the law, as it is experienced by its 
clients rather than by its philosophers.  Perhaps in the light 
of some kinds of legal philosophy it is bad law.  In my 
opinion, such legal philosophy has lost contact with the 
reality of modern society.31 
 
Ross’s larger point about the nature of tort law is worth noting.32  Ross’s 
point has taken hold in the American legal academy, and to a lesser extent 
in other jurisdictions influenced by the law and society approach that 
Ross’s classic study exemplified. 
I would never argue that tort doctrine and the consistent behavior of 
insurance adjusters are “law” in exactly the same sense, nor would I argue 
that tort doctrine is irrelevant.33  But I would argue that any law professor 
who thinks that the routine behavior of “street level bureaucrats”34 like 
insurance adjusters is not law needs to spend some time representing real 
people in the ordinary, low value accident cases that constitute the bulk of 
the tort law universe. 
                                                                                                         ———— 
31.  Id at 135. 
32.  Cf. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 103 (1990) (“[T]he rule . . . is the 
obstacle par excellence to the construction of an adequate theory of practice”). 
33.  Cf. id at 108 (“[T]he official description of reality is part of a full definition of 
reality . . . .”).  For an extended example of research incorporating doctrinal and law-in-
action analysis, see Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, 
Claims Stories and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1994). 
34.  See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). 




F. NEGOTIATIONS OVER INSURANCE BOUNDARIES DRIVE TORT 
LAW IN ACTION. 
 
The final way that liability insurance shapes tort law is a bit harder to 
describe, perhaps because this point may well be the only truly new idea in 
this essay.  The main idea here is to generalize an implied corollary of 
impacts one, two and three, above.  As you may recall, those three are: 
liability insurance is a de facto element of tort law, liability insurance limits 
are de facto caps on tort damages, and tort claims are shaped to match the 
available liability insurance coverage.  Each of these, of course, overstates 
the case.  There are exceptions. 
Each of these impacts call attention to a different kind of liability 
insurance boundary: who has liability insurance, for how much, and with 
regard to what kinds of liabilities?  Each of these kinds of boundaries exerts 
a shaping force on tort law. 
As a philosophical and doctrinal matter, tort liability certainly exists 
outside the boundaries of liability insurance coverage, but we are not going 
to go through the effort of establishing liability “out there” very often 
because there is no return in it.  This suggests that liability insurance 
coverage establishes to some extent the boundaries of tort law itself, or at 
the very least the boundaries of tort law in action. 
Alternatively, we might say that uninsured individuals are “outlaws” 
with regard to tort law and that liability insurance industry practices have 
the effect of making people outlaws with regard to tort liabilities.  The 
kinds of practices that turn people into tort law outlaws include exclusions 
in liability insurance policies, marketing practices that leave populations 
uninsured (e.g., redlining35), and the practice in the U.S. of bundling 
liability insurance with some kinds of property insurance but not others.36 
As this suggests, negotiation over who gets insurance, for how much, 
and against which kinds of liabilities drives tort law in action.  These 
negotiations occur in legislatures debating what kinds of liability insurance 
to require and when; in administrative agencies debating how much effort 
to devote to enforcement of the insurance mandate; within large 
organizations debating whether to include an insurance clause in a standard 
form contract, how to word the clause, and whether to allow waivers; 
among contracting parties negotiating whether to include insurance 
                                                                                                         ———— 
35.  INSURANCE REDLINING (G. Squires, ed., 1997). 
36.  See Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net? Home Insurance and 
Inequality, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 235 (1996) (reporting that the basic “dwelling 
protection” policy, unlike a “homeowners” policy does not contain liability insurance 
coverage). 
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requirements in their deals; and in the many places in which liability 
insurers establish and apply rules regarding who gets insurance, for how 
much, and against which kinds of liabilities.  These kinds of negotiations 
establish the boundaries of liability insurance coverage.  They separate the 
domesticated, insurance purchasing tort law citizen from the tort law 
outlaw, and they mark the frontier between the lawed and unlawed 
activities of that tort law citizen. 
A second kind of negotiation over boundaries takes place within the 
context of tort claims.  These are negotiations over whether this particular 
defendant has insurance, whether the insurance is sufficient to cover the 
amounts claimed as damages, and whether the particular liabilities at issue 
are covered by the defendant’s insurance policy.  Because of the 
profoundly practical effect of these negotiations—among other things, they 
determine whether and how much the plaintiffs’ lawyer will get paid—it is 
not surprising that they have spawned a host of secondary legal rules and 
professional norms.37  These secondary rules and norms define the 
boundaries of liability insurance coverage, so that a reasonably complete 
understanding of tort law in action requires not only an appreciation of the 
formal liability rules and the shape and extent of liability insurance 
coverage, but also the rules and norms that govern the resolution of 
questions regarding people and liabilities that lie in close proximity to the 
liability insurance boundaries. 
On the whole, my experience is that these secondary rules and norms 
operate to extend the liability insurance boundaries, but I would not make 
strong claims in that regard.  My field research suggests that these norms 
and rules allow plaintiffs to transform uninsurable punitive damages into 
additional insurable compensatory damages, transform uninsurable 
intentional torts into insurable negligence actions, obtain a larger share of 
the recovery than the formal subrogation or lien rules allow, and increase 
the present value of the available insurance coverage by increasing the 
potential liability of an insurance company that refuses to offer a quick 
settlement.38  On the other hand, my field research also suggests that in 
some circumstances plaintiffs care very deeply that the defendant pay with 
his or her own money—“blood money” some lawyers call it—because 
money from the insurance company will not adequately right the moral 
wrong that the defendant committed.39 
                                                                                                         ———— 
37.  See, e.g., Baker, Blood money, supra note 1. 
38.  See sources cited supra note 1. 
39.  See sources cited supra note 1. 




For present purposes we need not be very precise about these 
secondary rules and norms because my point is simply that they exist and 
that they are worthy and indeed even necessary objects of study for those 




This essay has described six ways that liability insurance shapes tort 
law in action.  For most practical purposes, liability insurance has become 
an element of tort liability for all but the wealthiest potential defendants.  
The contractual limits on the amount of liability insurance place a practical 
limit on the amount of tort damages that plaintiffs can receive.  Liability is 
shaped to match the available insurance coverage.  Liability insurance 
makes tort litigation into a repeat player game in which the insurance 
companies handle individual cases according to their long-term interest in 
the development of tort law rules and settlement norms.  Liability insurance 
personnel transform tort rules into more easily administered “rules of 
thumb.”  Finally, negotiations over insurance boundaries drive the 
development of tort law in action. 
I will conclude with a metaphor that may help to illustrate the power 
that liability insurance has to shape the development of tort law.  Imagine a 
network of streams and rivers carrying water through the countryside to the 
sea.  Water represents claims for relief.  Tort law is the network of streams, 
rivers and lakes through which the water flows into the sea.  Water that 
makes it into the sea represents the successful requests for tort law relief 
(whether by settlement, which is much more likely, or adjudication).  
Within this metaphor insurance is an invisible force that affects how much 
it rains and where, erects dams in some places, and sends huge torrents of 
water down others.  Within this metaphor insurance is a force that turns 
some small tort rivulets into streams, and some tort streams into wide, 
straight rivers of tort liability. 
Studying a snapshot of the landscape, we would clearly see how the 
tort law streams and rivers channel the flow of requests for relief, but we 
would miss the channeling force of liability insurance.  Anyone who goes 
out and lives in the countryside would soon notice the strange pattern of 
rainfall, the odd placement of dams.  Observing the landscape over time 
she might even start to wonder what, exactly, is channeling what.  Does the 
network of tort law streams and rivers channel the requests for relief or do 
those requests channel the streams and rivers?  And what explains why it 
rains so heavily on that hillside, while this other one is dry? 
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This metaphor is far from perfect, but it illustrates a powerful insight 
into the role that liability insurance plays in shaping tort law.  The insight is 
not mine, though I may have extended it a bit.  In the spirit of Nathan 
Isaacs, Roscoe Pound, Fleming James, and H. Laurence Ross I offer this 
insight across the Atlantic in the hopes of further conversations about 
insurance, law and society. 
 
